Network Security

I first learned about 802.1X when I was studying for one of the CCNP exams, BCMSN exam (SWITCH equivalent), at Ohlone College. At the time, I assumed that the short material covered in the book was all of it. Of course, that was a bad assumption in my part. That’s probably a normal assumption of someone who at the time just finished Cisco Network Academy Program CCNA 1 to 4 and newly minted CCNA with no professional experience.

What is 802.1X?

Essentially, 802.1X is a security feature that provides a mechanism to authenticate devices before it can access network resources. While it’s a good idea to have this security feature implemented, I’ve worked for companies who didn’t have this feature or similar implemented or it’s on their roadmap. It’s a shame that it wasn’t on their roadmap a long time ago since it was ratified in 2001. Then again, implementing technologies have its challenges.

How it works?

While there are other sources that will explain this in detail, this post includes a very short description on how it works. Basically, when a device connects to the wired network, the authenticator (switch) will send an EAP message to the supplicant (computer). If the computer has a supplicant, it will send an EAP response to the authenticator. The authenticator will then send a RADIUS message to the authentication server (RADIUS server). The authentication server will then challenge the supplicant to verify its identity. Once verified, the device will then be able to connect to organization’s network resources.

Environment

Every organization has their own unique implementation of technologies, so gather what you can and go from there. For example, in this scenario the requirements were to have two sets of RADIUS servers: one for switch-based authentication and the other for port-based authentication. This seems to be an uncommon setup so it required some research to split the two sets of RADIUS servers. My initial assumption was that it wasn’t possible. That assumption is only correct in older code, but with IOS 15.x the feature is supported.

This is a multivendor organization so LLDP is used instead of CDP, which is disabled globally by default due to the switch template configuration.

A lot of users are using Apple notebooks and/or desktops and most of these users are running VMware Fusion to run Windows and/or Linux.

IP phones are ubiquitous so this requires a great deal of attention. If my memory serves me right, the 802.1X topic in BCMSN didn’t cover how to implement it with IP phones so Cisco’s documentation and Google were my friend during my research.

A lot of devices do not have supplicant and there are instances where PXE boot is needed.

In addition, there were some locations that need WoL (Wake on LAN) feature so that needs an attention as well.

Configuration

As mentioned earlier, the requirement is to have two separate RADIUS servers for both switch-based and port-based authentication. That said, let’s take a look on how to do this. But first, let me show you how it was done prior to IOS 15.x code. This command still works in 15.0(2), but you’ll receive a warning saying that it will soon be deprecated.

Old format

radius-server host 192.168.1.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
radius-server host 192.168.1.2 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
radius-server retransmit 1
radius-server timeout 2
radius-server key 7 hashkeyhere

Since the requirement is to split the RADIUS servers, we need to use the new format of specifying the RADIUS servers which will be needed when we create the AAA groups.

New format

radius server switch-auth1
 address ipv4 192.168.1.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
 timeout 2
 retransmit 1
 key 7 hashkeyhere
radius server switch-auth2
 address ipv4 192.168.1.2 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
 timeout 2
 retransmit 1
 key 7 hashkeyhere
radius server dot1x-auth1
 address ipv4 192.168.1.3 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
 timeout 2
 retransmit 1
 key 7 hashkeyhere
radius server dot1x-auth2
 address ipv4 192.168.1.4 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813
 timeout 2
 retransmit 1
 key 7 hashkeyhere

Enable AAA

Once enabled, authentication method for 802.1X needs to be defined. I included the one for the switch-based authentication with the port-based authentication for completeness sake. RADIUS accounting is turned on as well since it is listed as best practice in Cisco’s deployment guide.

aaa new-model
aaa group server radius switch-auth
 server name switch-auth1
 server name switch-auth2
aaa group server radius dot1x-auth
 server name dot1x-auth1
 server name dot1x-auth2
aaa authentication login default group switch-auth enable
aaa authentication dot1x default group dot1x-auth
aaa accounting dot1x default start-stop group dot1x-auth
aaa authorization network default group dot1x-auth

Enable 802.1X

Issue the command below.

dot1x system-auth-control

Configure switch ports

Next step is to configure each switch port that will use 802.1X. This command will automatically include dot1x pae authenticator in the running configuration so don’t be alarmed if you see it there. This is to ensure that dot1x authentication still works on legacy configurations without manual intervention. NOTE: It seems to be that the IOS that I was using automatically included the dot1x pae authenticator command. That said, please make sure to add the command if you do not see it.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 ! Make sure that the ports should at least have switchport mode access or it won't take the commands.
 authentication port-control auto
 dot1x pae authenticator

In the IOS 12.x, this would’ve been a different command. The command in the old world is dot1x port-control auto.

Technically, the commands above are all we need to configure for the 802.1X to work. However, the environment in this scenario requires more things from us that we still need to address.

VoIP phones

Let’s address the IP phones first since it’s ubiquitous within the enterprise environment. By default, the interfaces are set to be single-host mode. This means only one MAC is allowed in the data VLAN. This mode technically allows another MAC address but on the voice VLAN and only if CDP is supported. Since CDP is disabled on all of the switches deployed in this scenario, this needs to be enabled. I included the single-host mode command below since it won’t show up in the running configuration because it is the default configuration.

cdp run
interface g1/0/1 - 48
 authentication host-mode single-host

While this configuration works, there are few things that we need to keep in mind. The single-host mode means only single MAC can be authenticated on a switch port. If a different MAC address is detected on a port after an endpoint has authenticated then a security violation is triggered on the port. This will cause the port to be in errdisabled state and will require a manual intervention unless errdisable recovery is configured.

Since the computers are daisy chained on the back of the Cisco phones, there are technically two MAC addresses that will be seen on the port. As mentioned earlier, the single-host mode ignores the MAC address seen in the voice VLAN so this should work. It does work, however, once you shut the port down and enable it again, and phone or switch reboots, the switch port will see two MAC addresses on the data VLAN.

Now, you’re probably wondering why would the switch see two MAC addresses in the data VLAN when the IP Phone should only show up in the voice VLAN especially when the boot process is described in books like this. But, I’ve seen this happened in all three organizations I’ve worked for where the phone’s MAC address shows up in both data and voice VLAN, as shown below. If you do a quick search, you’ll see more people are seeing the same thing so it appears that this is the default behavior.

switch#sh mac add int g1/0/1
          Mac Address Table
-------------------------------------------
Vlan    Mac Address       Type        Ports
----    -----------       --------    -----
  10    0004.f2f0.4d98    DYNAMIC     Gi1/0/1
  20    0004.f2f0.4d98    DYNAMIC     Gi1/0/1
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 2

As you can imagine, this could turn to an operational nightmare especially when you have facilities people going in and out of the closet to do some work and they occasionally bump into the power cord of the switch by accident. The solution is to change the host mode to something that will not cause a security violation. One option is to use the Multi-domain authentication (MDA), which is shown below.

interface range g1/0/1- 48
 authentication host-mode multi-domain

MDA vs Multi-Auth

Multi-domain authentication (MDA) allows one MAC address on both data and voice VLAN. It is kind of similar with the single-host mode but this mode requires the device in the voice VLAN to authenticate. Initial testing looks like it’s working as expected. I didn’t see the same behavior where the phone’s MAC address shows up on both VLANs when I bounced the port.

MDA does not address the fact that the environment in our scenario will have users running VMware Fusion on their computer(s). When the user configures the VM with a network type of bridged mode, which means the switch will see two MAC addresses, then that will result in a security violation. This needs to be addressed so there has to be another mode that we could use. Fortunately, there is and it is called multiple authentication.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 authentication host-mode multi-auth

The difference between MDA and multiple authentication is that it allows multiple MAC addresses in the data VLAN, however, all devices must be authenticated to access the network resources.

As mentioned, there is a way to automatically recover from a security violation, by default it is set to five minutes. Before I show you the command for it, let’s think about the fact that the port will be in the errdisabled state once a security violation occurs. That means, the phones will be out of commission too. This is going to be frustrating for the users so we need to find a solution that only errdisable the VLAN where the security violation occurred. Fortunately, the switch has the voice aware 802.1X security feature and is shown below with the errdisable recovery.

errdisable detect cause security-violation shutdown vlan
errdisable recovery cause security-violation

MAC Authentication Bypass

The devices that do not support 802.1X feature still needs to access network resources so we need to find a way to let them in without disabling the port-based authentication where these devices are connected to. Cisco supports fallback mechanisms when a device fails to authenticate using 802.1X. A great option for devices that do not support 802.1X is the MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB).

With MAB, the MAC address is entered to the RADIUS server and when the device fails to authenticate using the 802.1X then the switch will fallback to MAB. The switch will then forward a message, with the MAC address of the device, to the RADIUS server. RADIUS server will then check its database to see if the MAC address is in its list. If it is, then the RADIUS server will signal the switch to allow access to the network. To enable MAB, issue the command below.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 mab

Another version of this command is shown below. If this command is used, the IOS will change it to mab in the running and startup config.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 dot1x mac-auth-bypass

While this fallback mechanism works, Cisco Catalyst switches have default values which delays the transition of a non-802.1X compliant from unauthorized to authenticated for 90 seconds. This might cause some issues with DHCP or PXE clients so it is recommended to tweak the default values to make it faster for the non-802.1X compliant devices to access network resources.

The 90 seconds is the combination of the dot1x max-reauth-req and dot1x timeout tx-period values. The default value for the former is two and the latter is 30 seconds. Multiply both values and the result is 60 seconds. You’re probably thinking where’s the other 30 out of the 90 seconds? Well, that was the initial request for the device to authenticate and when it fails the switch will then send a request. It would keep sending up to the configured max-reauth-req values when there’s no response from the device. It is recommended to test what’s best for your network since there are really no recommended values. For our scenario, let’s configure them with a value of one and 10 seconds.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 dot1x max-reauth-req 1
 dot1x timeout tx-period timer 10

The last thing that we need to address is the WoL feature that some people use in the environment. By default, traffic through the unauthorized port is blocked in both directions and the magic packet, WoL packet sent by the server, never gets to the sleeping computer.

To support the WoL feature in 802.1X environment, we’ll need to configure the switch to allow outbound traffic to the unauthorized port but still control the incoming traffic. The command to do this is shown below.

interface range g1/0/1 - 48
 authentication control-direction in

Other considerations

Not every scenario is covered here so I recommend you to read Cisco’s configuration and deployment guide about 802.1X. For example, what if all RADIUS servers that handles the port-based authentication are unreachable? That would mean, unauthorized ports trying to move to authenticated ports will not work. Configuring critical VLAN both for data and voice may be necessary for this environment.

For partners’ devices, how would you like to handle their access to network resources? Would you allow them by implementing a Guest VLAN feature?

If you opt for using EAP-TLS, how would you manage the deployment of the certificates to all devices including mobile? This might frustrate users and may also overwhelm the desktop support staff if not handled properly.

What if your organization use non-Cisco phones? What will happen to the devices behind the phones once it gets authenticated and gets removed from the port? Does it support EAPoL Logoff/Proxy EAPoL Logoff? This is not an issue with Cisco phones with CDP since it supports CDP Enhancement for Second Port Disconnect. With this feature, when the user disconnects from the phone’s port, the phone will signal the Catalyst switch to move the data VLAN from authenticated to unauthorized state.

How do you want to authenticate the phones? Do you want to use EAP-MD5, MIC (Manufacturer Installed Certificate), or LSC (Locally Significant Certificate)?

If you do allow MAB fallback mechanism, how do you combat the possibility of unauthorized users spoofing MAC addresses that are in your RADIUS’s MAC address database? If the organization is big enough, how do you manage adding MAC addresses to the database? How do you maintain the database properly without leaving temporary entries?

Thoughts

Deploying 802.1X definitely has its challenges. This could be the reason why some organizations choose to not have some type of port-based authentication because of it may affect the availability of network resources. When it comes to deployment, I believe proper planning and testing is needed to make it a smooth deployment. Few things that could be used to make it a smooth deployment are the following: monitor mode, low impact mode, and closed mode, which is covered in this Cisco Live! presentation. Some might just opt for the lab testing then move to pilot phase, which is doable in my opinion.

References

CCNP SWITCH
Wired 802.1X Deployment Guide
Catalyst 2960X Configuration Guide

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